New Modes and Orders: Is a Jus Post Bellum of Constitutional Transformation
Possible or Desirable?
Nehal Bhuta
Brave Belgian nation! We enter your territory to help you plant the tree of liberty, without meddling at all
in the constitution that you wish to adopt. As long as you establish the sovereignty of the People and
renounce living under any despots whatsoever, we will be your brothers, your friends, your supporters. We
will respect your proprieties and your laws.1
Where unfortunately some province, city or town would be depraved enough by slavery to fail to seize
enthusiastically the tree of liberty that the French want to establish … then this province, this city, this
village will be treated like the vile slaves of the house of Austria.2
To make in cities new governments with new names, new authorities, new men; to make the rich poor, the
poor rich … to build new cities, to take down those built, to exchange the inhabitants from one place to
another; and in sum, not to leave anything untouched. […] I do not know whether this has ever occurred or
whether it is possible. [It would be] a very cruel enterprise or altogether impossible.3

Introduction
At the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, the Russian Imperial
Senate decreed that Russia committed itself to upholding the 1864 Geneva Convention
and to observing the general principles of the 1874 Brussels Conference’s “Proposed
Laws for Land Warfare” – even though the latter remained a non-binding draft treaty
text.4 Included in the Brussels’ Declaration was an early draft codification of the law of
belligerent occupation, with its basic constitutive principle that the occupant must
maintain the laws in force in the occupied territory unless absolutely prevented.5
Belligerent occupation as a legal institution was, and is, predicated on the notion that a
military occupier cannot exercise sovereign rights over the occupied territory, and thus
has a legislative competence limited by international law. Certainly, permanent
constitutional change was enjoined, although the occupier might lawfully suspend the
occupied territory’s constitutional and political order for the duration of the occupation,
where military necessity required it.6
Despite British consular claims of Russian “atrocities” – apparently motivated by
power political interests7 – it seems that the Russian army in its 1877-8 campaign set a
1

General Charles Francois Dumouriez, upon the entry of the French army into Belgium, 1792, quoted in
Chimène Keitner, The Paradoxes of Nationalism (2007) 110 (emphasis mine).
2
General Charles Francois Dumouriez, 1793, quoted in ibid 114.
3
Machiavelli, Discourses, Book I, pp. 47-61. (Chicago 1996 ed.)
4
Peter Holquist, “From Expulsion to ‘Civilian Affairs’: Russian Policy from the Conquest of the Western
Caucusus (1860-1864) to the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War,” paper presented to Centre d’études du Monde
russe, soviétique et post-soviétique, Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociales, Paris, May 28, 2004.
Thanks to Professor Holquist for permission to cite his paper.
5
Brussels Declaration, Art 41. Oxford Code of 1881, Arts 6, 41; Hall, A Treatise on International Law,
1884, at 444.
6
See generally the sources cited in Bhuta, Antinomies of Transformative Occupation, 16 EJIL (2005) 721,
at 726 (notes 26-30).
7
Holquist, above n 4, 17.

new standard for compliance with the laws of war. In September 1877, the Institute for
International Law issued a finding that praised Russian observance of the laws and
customs of war and condemned Ottoman violations.8 But in one crucial respect, Russia
rejected the application of the Brussels’ Declaration. In its occupation of Bulgaria after
the retreat of Ottoman forces, Russia departed from the fundamental conservationist
imperative of occupation law and engaged in a transformation of the existing legal and
administrative structures. The rationale for this non-observance of occupation law
derived, in Russia’s view, from the object of the war: rather than advance Russian selfinterest, the war aimed at the liberation of Bulgarians from the antiquated and despotic
constitutional order of the Ottomans. Occupation law’s requirement that the occupier
restore and preserve order and “la vie publique” did not apply because the territory was
“in a state of anarchy under Turkish rule and, in any case, lacked any properly constituted
civic organs.”9 In short, in Russian eyes there was no proper public order and life to
preserve. Rather, the liberationist objective of the war obliged the Russians to ensure for
the population “those sacred rights, without which the peaceful and proper development
of your civic life is inconceivable.” The occupation therefore sought to establish
“independent national administration in Bulgaria, founded on the principles of selfgovernment and satisfying the spirit and needs of the people summoned to their new
life.”10
Holquist notes that the reforms enacted by the tsarist occupation regime in
Bulgaria paralleled those that Alexander II and his bureaucrats had been pursuing at
home, but which had lost momentum by 1877. Bulgaria was thus a “laboratory” for these
civic reforms, implemented by reformist bureaucrats in the newly established “civilian
affairs” branch of the army.11 Feodor de Martens, the leading Russian proponent of the
laws of war and a central participant in the 1874 Brussels Conference, condoned the
Russian departure from this aspect of the Brussels Declaration as consistent with the
noble aims of the war,12 – although he conceded that the “Russian government knew
more about Ceylon than it did about the existing administration of Bulgaria and the
wishes of its inhabitants.”13
The Russian explication of the rationale for its transformative project in Bulgaria
finds a not-so-faint echo in contemporary developments. Whether framed in terms
“nation-building,”14 “neo-trusteeship,”15 “jus post-bellum”16 or “transformative
occupation,”17 there has been renewed interest in deriving a legal framework governing
fundamental political change under various forms of foreign territorial administration.18
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Despite a variety of ad hoc developments (mostly through the Security Council),19 the
idea of constitutional transformation under the territorial administration of a foreign
power presently remains in deep tension with the cardinal principles of the post-Second
World War international legal nomos: non-intervention (and a concomitant acceptance of
a plurality of acceptable forms of political legitimation), sovereign equality, and selfdetermination qua decolonization and non-alien domination.
I have previously argued that the law of belligerent occupation, with its
prohibition on constitutional change in the occupied territory at the hands of the
occupying power, can be understood as crystallizing in the aftermath of the French
revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, as part of the re-founding of the intra-European land
order.20 The Vienna settlement of 1815 repudiated the French revolutionary claim that the
universalization of popular sovereignty (the planting of “the tree of liberty”) was a
principle of international order that transcended all others. Against this substantive
conception of international legitimacy, the post-1815 order consecrated – among
European states, at least – an order in which plural forms of political order21 could coexist and in which the revolutionary transformation of one state’s constitutional order by
another was restrained by the legalized hegemony of the Great Powers.22 In the
aftermath of decolonization, the current international order has effectively universalized
this aspect of the 1815 nomos through the concepts of sovereign equality and nonintervention, both of which imply that the international order permits the coexistence of a
considerable plurality of forms of political legitimation – although the conduct of
governments within polities is subject to certain universal norms such as human rights
law and international criminal law.
The proposition that international law and the law of belligerent occupation can
and should be adapted to promote not just constitutional transformation, but a particular
vision of domestic constitutional order, anticipates a return to a radically more
substantive concept of international order. This vision goes further than capacious and
somewhat malleable notions such as “democracy,” “political participation” and
“development” to a highly specific conception of the good polity and economy:
“revolutionary changes in [the] economy (including a leap into robust capitalism),
rigorous implementation of international human rights standards, a new constitution and
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judiciary ….”23 A justification for promoting this vision of domestic order is the
decidedly sociological claim that the creation of governments based on “popular
sovereignty held by individuals instead of states or elites”24 are most likely to “remove
the causes of violence”25 that may have brought about the territorial administration. As
Bain observes in his history of the concept of trusteeship, such justifications have a
strong affinity with the rationales for the maintenance of dependent territories during the
colonial epoch:
A society that is paralyzed by disorder or falls into a state of unconscionable tyranny must be
instructed in becoming a good society … This project entails nothing less than reconstructing
public life, radically if necessary, so that it is consistent with the highest standards of
internationally recognized human rights, adheres to democratic principles of governance, and
results in the creation of a market-based economy … It is difficult to see how this arrangement
differs substantially from Lugard’s view that political development in British Africa should allow
the greatest possible measure of liberty and self-development, ‘subject to the laws and policy of
the [British colonial] administration.’26

But the idea of instituting this vision of the good constitutional order is also
claimed to be a means of realizing another fundamental principle of the contemporary
international order: self-determination.27 Thus, Roberts contends that occupying powers
can justify certain policies as “the best way to meet certain goals and principles enshrined
in human rights law, including the right to self-determination.”28 Roberts maintains that
“of all the parts of a transformative project, the ones likely to have the strongest appeal
include the introduction of an honest electoral system as part of a multiparty democracy
… reflecting as it does the sense that democracy and self-determination … constitute not
only an important part of the human rights package, but also an acceptable means of
hastening the end of an occupation.”29 Political theorist Jean Cohen expresses far more
skepticism about the risk of expanding the legislative authority of an occupying power
“in name of democratic regime change” or human rights promoting reforms,30 but also
seeks to find a place for the law of self-determination as a regulative principle curbing
the authority of the would-be transformative occupant. She argues that the conservationist
principle of occupation law must be read in light of self-determination to ensure the
“internal sovereignty of the people, which … cannot be confiscated by or regulated by
outsiders.”31 Her call is for a project of legal codification of a jus post-bellum that would
23
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provide a set of rules and procedures governing the relationship between occupier or
administrator and the population of a territory, in order to ensure that constitutional
change is indeed a product of the internal sovereignty of the people. The source of this set
of legal rules is unclear in Cohen’s proposal, but the implication is that the rules would
derive from the principle of self-determination.
Roberts’ and Cohen’s positions are different in critical respects, but both place a
version of “self-determination” at the center of an attempt to reconcile “transformative
occupation” (or similar projects) with the cardinal principles of international order. For
Roberts, an occupant or administrator’s program to institute a political order involving
free elections and “multiparty democracy” appears to constitute a means of realizing selfdetermination. For Cohen, self-determination must regulate the process by which the
population of the territory design and institute their political order, with as little
involvement of the occupant or administrator as possible and certainly no prescription of
constitutional substance. Uniting both of these uses of self-determination is the idea that
its content involves popular sovereignty as the legitimating principle of domestic political
order.
Can a project of constitutional transformation under occupation or administration
be consistent with, or even a means of realizing self-determination? Can the international
law of self-determination provide determinate legal rules to regulate the role of a foreign
occupant in the creation of a new constitutional order, and can it impose any real
restraints on the factual power of the occupant to promote its own vision of the good
constitutional order? The first part of this paper seeks to answer these questions by
undertaking an analysis of the relationship between the law of occupation and the law of
self-determination. The paper suggests that although the law of self-determination has as
a normative presupposition a notion of popular sovereignty, it presently contains almost
no determinate rules outside the decolonization context as to how to determine the “will
of the people” in the creation of a new domestic political order. As such, it is difficult to
envisage how self-determination as an international legal principle could be the basis for
rules that restrain what is effectively a plenary power exercised by a would-be
transformative occupant in managing the process of transforming the constitutional order
of a state.
The second part of the paper asks more fundamentally whether a set of rules or
principles governing the creation of a new constitutional order under occupation or
administration is even possible or desirable. I suggest that, in order to answer the
question of the proper role of international law in regulating constitutional transformation
under occupation or internationally supervised state-building, we must first re-examine
the relationship between “state and constitution”, and between “state-making” and
“constitution-making.” This inquiry will in turn shed light upon whether the nature of
“state-making and constitution-making” is something can be usefully regulated by legal
rules, and in addition, whether international law should be the vehicle for the prescription
of such rules for this kind of activity. Hence, as part of answering the question, “should
foreign-led constitutional transformation be subjected to legal rules,” I also try to answer
two related questions: what do we do when we make a constitution in these
circumstances and who is the proper agent (be they individuals or collectivities) of
constitution-making, and; to the extent that foreign actors are involved in this, is it
desirable for international law to develop norms regulating their behaviour. “Desirability”

is considered from two points of view: the desirability of such rules from the point of
view of the success or failure of producing a new state-and-constitutional order (i.e. will
the rules help or hinder?), and; the desirability from the point of view of the normative
structure of international law – are there costs involved for the nature of international law
as “inter-public law”,32 if we formulate international law rules that prescribe particular
modes and methods of political legitimation? Hence, part of what is at stake in all of this
is the future “geology”33 of international law and the kinds of political values it should
(or should not) embrace.
Part I: Self-determination and Popular Sovereignty
The idea of “the sovereignty of the people” as a principle of domestic order first
develops real political and polemical potency in England’s 17th century power struggles
between Crown and Parliament.34 Morgan reminds us that the principle of popular
sovereignty established the fiction, not the reality, of the people as the sole basis for the
legitimacy of a form of government: popular sovereignty remained, “like the fictions that
preceded it, a way of reconciling the many to the government of a few.”35 Moreover, the
history of the use of the concept during the English revolutions of the 17th century
demonstrated that “popular sovereignty did not necessarily dictate one form of
government rather than another … The sovereignty of the people offered no obstacle to
the restoration of the king.”36
But like all powerful political fictions, popular sovereignty developed a life and
logic of its own. France’s 1789 Revolution first actualized the modern concept of
constitution37 as a document of superior normativity that establishes the legal rules for
political government.38 The legitimacy of this document derived from its status as the
means of instituting the purported sovereign will of the people. In the formulation of the
most incisive theorist of the revolution’s founding moment, Abbe Sieyès,39 the
constitution’s authority flows from “the nation’s” singular entitlement to determine the
laws by which it governs itself. This formulation endows the nation with “active,
immediate sovereignty”40 and an “inalienable and unitary common will” that existed
prior to all constituted institutions. Indeed, the nation was “part of a natural order, prior to
all history.”41 As Baker observes, Sieyès construction of the nation is fictional in as much
as it inverts the historical reality of the relationship between the nation and the absolutist
state: “the nation, created in the course of centuries by the persistent efforts of the
32
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monarchical state, now became metaphysically prior to it.”42 Schmitt similarly notes that
“on the European continent, these fundamental ideas of political unity and national
determination arose as the result of the political determination of the absolute
monarchy”.43 Nevertheless, the idea that the people – presupposed as a politically
existing entity and conscious of their political unity – are the bearers of the pouvoir
constituent emerged as “the political dogma of the entire subsequent period”.44
The French revolutionaries quickly extended the logic of national determination
beyond the French nation. The universalizing logic of the ideas that nations are natural,
not historical, orders and that only popular sovereignty can be the basis for true liberty
meant that the revolutionaries saw their principles “as relevant not only to the French
nation, but also to humanity as a whole.”45 The revolutionary conception of international
order that flowed from these domestic principles was of an international family of
sovereign peoples, rather than a society of existing states.46 Implicit in this normative
logic is also the idea of the nation-state, in which the territory of a state corresponds to
the (pre-existing and ahistorical) national peoples that inhabit it. Thus, the idea of
national self-determination in French revolutionary thinking, and its construction of “the
nation” as pouvoir constituent, lay at “the intersection of domestic and international
politics and is in fact constitutive of the boundary between them. In the French
Revolutionary model, domestic constitutive principles were a matter of international
concern.”47
Although the Vienna settlement effectively banished the revolutionist conception
of international legitimacy from the jus publicum Europaeum, the idea that the “nation”
qua collective will of the population constitutes the foundation for the legitimacy of
domestic political order was developing as a political “metaconcept.”48 The reaction’s
efforts to mobilize armed popular resistance to the Napoleonic armies rested on an
invocation of “nation-ness” and the undesirability of foreign rule,49 and allowed for the
implication that “popular will rather than dynastic right was the basis of sovereignty.”50
As in the English Civil War, the fiction of the “people’s will” was invoked both by
revolutionaries and restorationists, to justify their particular form of rule.51
It was in this 19th century European context of competing and contradictory
principles of political legitimation that the legal institution of occupation bellica
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emerged.52 Its rule against the exercise of sovereign rights by the occupying power
implies that sovereignty continues to reside with the departed government of the territory,
unless the territory is subsequently ceded by peace treaty or the sovereign is completely
defeated and no allies continue fight on its behalf (debellatio). The conservationist
principle of occupation law entailed no particular commitment to the idea that the
population of the territory was the repository of sovereignty. Rather, by consecrating the
legitimacy of the pre-occupation status quo, the principle was equally amenable to
parliamentary, absolutist or authoritarian forms of government. Thus, at the time of their
emergence as, respectively, legal and political concepts, belligerent occupation and
national self-determination had no necessary relation to each other: the former was a
legal institution, while the latter was one of a variety of contested concepts of domestic
political legitimacy.
Self-determination reemerges as a potential principle of international order with
the final collapse of the 1815 settlement and in the aftermath of the first “total war” of the
20th century. Wilsonian self-determination,53 with its contradictory impulses, illustrated
the tensions between pluralist and substantivist trajectories in the notion of selfdetermination as an international legal principle. Wilson’s use of the term oscillated
between a notion of government based on the consent of the governed (by which he
seemed to mean liberal constitutional democracy or tutelary democracy for colonized
peoples),54 consent of the population to territorial change or changes of sovereignty over
them,55 and the principle that territory should follow “nationality”.56 The application of
the principle in the inter-war period was equally uneven,57 with its status as a legal rule
famously rejected by the Aaland Islands Committees.58 Where it was invoked, it was as a
principle governing territorial divisions of populations and the distribution of
competences to govern them, rather than as a demand that newly formed states adopt
democratic forms of government.59
External Self-Determination and Popular Sovereignty
When the “self-determination of peoples” was finally enshrined in the United
Nations Charter as a directive principle of the post-Second World War legal order, it
52
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remained undefined. Cassese records that the preparatory work indicate that the
“Wilsonian dream of representative governments for all was not contemplated.”60 Rather,
the notion of “self-government” associated with self-determination in the debates was
non-foreign rule or non-foreign domination. In its initial phase (1945 to 1973), the
evolution of self-determination as a legal principle of the international order shared a
close conceptual kinship with the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention,
and tended to reinforce and reproduce a plurality of principles of political legitimation.
The post-war United Nations practice established self-determination as the right
of non-self-governing peoples and the populations of dependent territories to a free
choice as to their political status. That is, the right of the population of colonial territories
to a choice as to independence, free association with their metropolitan power, or
integration.61 The “people” entitled to self-determination in these circumstances
constituted the entire population of the territory,62 the borders of which remained
unaltered by virtue of the principle of uti posseditis juris. The method of determining the
“genuine will of the people” was straightforward: a plebiscitary choice between
independence and some other status, or some form of commission of inquiry under UN
auspices.63 The outcome of the free choice was, more often than not, statehood, at which
point the principle of self-determination is “represented by the rule against intervention in
the internal affairs of that state and in particular in the choice of form of government of
the state.”64
In this “external” form of self-determination, embodied in the practice of
decolonization, “the will of the people” relevant to international legal rules pertains only
to the political status of the territorial entity to which the people belong.65 “Popular
sovereignty” is a presupposition of external self-determination, but only in a thin
procedural manifestation: the yes or no choice of a plebiscite concerning the question of
the international status of the polity, rather than its constitutional order. Once the choice
is made, and if the choice is statehood, self-determination prescribes an injunctive rule
against external interference in the domestic organization of political order.66 The
principle of non-intervention speaks of a state’s choice of a “political, economic, social
and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy”67 but prescribes nothing
60
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concerning the means and methods by which these choices are made. One could read into
the word “choice” a residual element of the “will of the people,” but the phrase would
have no determinate legal content. And as noted above, the political content of the “will
of the people” is highly flexible.
A straightforward extension of the concept of external self-determination is that it
is violated by military occupation or other forms of “alien domination,” except where the
use of force was justified under Article 51 of the UN Charter and the occupation is
restricted to the time period and extent necessary to repel aggression.68 To the extent that
external self-determination is a right of those peoples to be free from “alien domination,
subjugation and exploitation,”69 this would include freedom from military occupation “as
the least controversial category.”70
Internal Self-Determination and Popular Sovereignty
A. Contrastive Definition
The “internal” aspect of self-determination remains far less clear in international
law and practice.71 The most common scenario occasioning discussion of internal selfdetermination involves the situation of an ethnic, racial, linguistic or national group
within an existing state that is a denied a certain respect for its situation.72 The denial
might range from discrimination and systematic exclusion from political life on the basis
of race or ethnic group, to systematic persecution through violations of basic rights to
life, liberty and bodily integrity.73
The international law of self-determination seems to countenance three
possibilities as a response to such a situation.74 First, where the excluded group is a racial
group and constitutes a substantial part or even a majority of the population of the state,
“self-determination” as formulated in the “safeguard clause” of the Friendly Relations
Declaration75 may require such changes in the political form of government as necessary
to ensure that the government “represents” the population of the territory without
discrimination on the basis of race, creed or color.76 Clearly formulated with the
apartheid regimes in mind,77 the realization of the right to self-determination in this
scenario would seem to entail the removal of formally discriminatory laws and
68
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institutions which disenfranchise the racial group and impede its access to national
institutions. The “safeguard clause” of the Friendly Relations Declaration thus implies
that systematic discrimination against a (majority) racial group along the lines of
apartheid constitutes an absence of self-determination.
Second, a definable sub-state group might gain international recognition of its
demand for a special political status within a state,78 where this status is linked to the
resolution of a conflict which has become of concern to surrounding states or the
international community more broadly. Thus, as Ringelheim concludes in her carefully
documented review of international responses to the status of Kosovo between 1996 to
2000, there is little support among states for a right to autonomy for internal ethnic
groups.79 However, a negotiated autonomy regime may be linked to a framework of
conflict resolution required by the Security Council or regional international
organizations in their efforts to restore international peace and security.80
Third, a sub-state group that successfully and effectively secedes from the state
might receive recognition of its newly-formed state by the international community.
Despite a deep-seated reluctance to accord any “right” of secession, a sub-state group
which is totally excluded from the political system and suffers systematic and egregious
human rights violations at the hands of state authorities, with no prospect of effective
remedies, could be accepted as having an entitlement to form its own state as a last
resort.81
Each of these dimensions of internal self-determination, based on the “oppressed
sub-state group” scenario, is essentially contrastive. That is, their determinacy as legal
rules derives from being able to establish the absence or negation of a state of affairs
(discrimination and denial of equal participation on the basis of race, systematic denial of
basic human rights and so forth). As such, they provide almost no prescriptive rules for
the domestic constitutional order of a territory as a whole – indeed, “internal” selfdetermination does not even appear to establish a right to some form of autonomy for a
sub-state group. At best, the Friendly Relations Declaration requires that racial groups
have equal rights to participate in national governmental processes.82 Cassese’s review of
the state of the law concerning “internal self-determination” leads him to conclude,
rightly in my view, that it contains little or no positive guidance as to how the principle of
“internal self-determination” might be realized or the options that might be available to
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the “oppressed population” said to benefit from the principle.83 This seems to reinforce
my argument that while internal self-determination clearly forms part of the wider
principle of self-determination in international law, its evolution by reference to
particular historical cases (such as the South African apartheid regime) leaves it largely
indeterminate as a source of rules for the design of a constitutional order or the means
and manner of instituting “popular sovereignty.” At best, it can be said that the principle
rules out certain things, such as systematic and explicit racial discrimination in the
structures of government.
B. Teleological Interpretation
A more institutionally prescriptive notion of internal self-determination emerges
from one might call the “teleological” reading of the right. This reading, which is based
on Common Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), revives that aspect of “Wilsonian” self-determination which emphasized the
“consent of the governed” as the content of the norm. As noted above, Wilson’s use of
the “consent of the governed” seemed to imply a liberal constitutional model of the
American kind – some kind of pluralist liberal democracy or polyarchy. This
interpretation of self-determination reemerges in the international debate as part of the
Cold War ideological contestation over the relative virtue of the two political and
economic systems in confrontation: against the success of the Soviet and emergent Third
World bloc in promoting self-determination as decolonization (and, sub silentio, social
revolution), the Western bloc emphasized that the principle entailed “legitimate, lively
dissent and testing at the ballot box with frequent regularity.”84 Self-determination qua
liberal democracy was thus initially a polemical counter-concept to self-determination
qua decolonization and “third worldism”. But the argument also reflected the several
normative possibilities inherent in self-determination.
Common Article 1 of the two Covenants states that “All peoples have the right to
self-determination. By virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”85 The “teleological”
reading of Article 1 treats it as a “summation” of the rights to civil and political freedom
contained in other parts of the ICCPR, such as the right to freedom of expression (Article
19) and the right to political participation (Article 25). Thus, Cassese contends that
Article 1 can be read as a “manifestation of the totality” of rights embodied in the
ICCPR,86 which require that people “choose legislators and political leaders, free from
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manipulation and undue influence.” In Cassese’s treatment, this implies a pluralist liberal
democracy with competitive elections.87 The normative logic of this argument is very
attractive, emphasizing as it does a strong reading of the “popular sovereigntist” content
of the right to self-determination, and construing the right as one of continuous,
participatory self-government and societal autonomy. However, the contention that this
politico-philosophical logic is replicated in the international legal content of the principle
is less persuasive.
Article 1 refers a people’s right to freely determine their political status. “Political
status” is a notion that encompasses several possibilities: free choice of a political system
(populist democracy, liberal democracy, plebiscitary dictatorship); free choice of
“rulers,” which could mean a regime or a government88 (electing Democrats over
Republicans, or choosing the Chinese Communist Party as the enduring representative of
the peoples’ will); or a free choice of government within the context of an alreadyestablished political regime. A people’s right to choose their political status does not of
itself imply liberal pluralist democracy,89 unless one confines the meaning of “status” to a
free choice of government.
Similarly, the right to political participation contained in Article 25 of the ICCPR
“does not distinguish among such political systems as liberal democracy, democratic
socialism, corporatism or communism.”90 Indeed, the drafting history of the right reflects
the concern by states on both sides of the Cold War ideological divide to ensure that their
own system of political order was not “in instant violation of Article 25.”91 The resulting
formulations in the treaty text are, and were intended to be, compatible with a variety of
electoral regimes and theories of political participation.92 Perhaps the highest one can put
it is that Article 1 and the political rights contained in the body of the ICCPR require
some notion of the consent of the governed as essential to the creation and maintenance
of a domestic political system under international law.93 Some concept of popular
collective expression of the individual rights of the members of each political society.” Crawford, “The
Right to Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and Future”, p.25.
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sovereignty thus unites Articles 1 and 25,94 but the content of the concept is not really
determinate.95
The Human Rights Committee’s practice has not embraced the strong teleological
reading of Article 1 as a summa of political rights in the ICCPR. The Committee accepts
the connection between Article 1 and Article 25, but notes that “the rights under article
25 are related to, but distinct from, the right of peoples to self-determination. By virtue of
the [right to self-determination], peoples … enjoy the right to choose the form of their
constitution or government. Article 25 deals with the right of individuals to participate in
those processes which constitute the conduct of public affairs.”96 In its Concluding
Observations on State Party Reports since 1991, the Committee has, with one exception,
not associated the exercise of rights under Article 25 with Article 1.97 In that concluding
observation, regarding the Republic of Congo, the Committee expressed its concern that a
postponement of general elections for a new government and of a referendum on a new
constitution would deprive Congolese citizens of their rights under articles 1 and 25.98
Interestingly, the context of this concluding observation was the aftermath of a civil war
and the ratification of a new constitution draft was part of a mediated peace process. The
Committee’s brief remarks indicate that, at minimum, it considers the right to selfdetermination to be relevant to the process of creating a new constitutional order. By the
same token, the right would appear to be satisfied by the relatively thin procedural
obligation to ensure a referendum on the new constitutional text, and general elections, in
accordance with principles of universal suffrage. Hence, the legal content of popular
sovereignty implied here is similar to that implied by the plebiscitary practice of external
self-determination: a yes or no choice concerning a draft constitutional text; the rule
appears to have little to say about the process of generating the text itself – a process
which entails the constituting of the constituent-power.

administering authority has a measure of discretion in determining the persons in the territory to whom the
grant will be made.” The limit of this discretion appears to be that the government to which the authority
hands power can “fairly be said to be representatives of the people.”
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Conclusion
The foregoing discussion suggests the conclusion that the international law of selfdetermination does imply “popular sovereignty,” but in a highly under-determined
manner. Such positive rules and established practices as do exist embody a thin,
procedural manifestation of the “will of the people” – a manifestation that can only
express itself in a yes or no choice over a pre-agreed (usually binary) set of possibilities,
such as independence or continued association with the colonial state, or adoption or
rejection of a draft constitutional text.99 In its external form, self-determination concerns
not the internal constitution of political order, but the political status of a territory and
population and the international distribution of competences to govern the population. In
its internal mode, self-determination is largely a contrastive definition which provides
relatively little guidance as to the form of an internal political order and, most relevant to
this argument, no guidance as to the process of creating that order. Notwithstanding some
evidence that “democracy” has become something of an ill-defined primus inter pares of
principles of political legitimation, it cannot be said that rules of self-determination
contain concrete prescriptions about the form of political system obligated by
international law.
One reason for the lack of determinacy of self-determination as popular
sovereignty may be its peculiar, janus-faced nature as an international legal principle: on
the one hand, its external aspect is cognate with the principle of non-intervention and a
sovereign, territorially-based entitlement to non-interference in the choice of political and
social system – a legacy of the universalization of the 19th century legal order.100 On the
other hand, its internal aspect reiterates the idea of a population’s choice of political
system and thus appears to encode a specific principle of political legitimacy – popular
sovereignty. The tension implied in uniting these two sets of potentially contradictory
ideas under one legal principle tends to diminish the concreteness of the norm itself.
Part II: Belligerent Occupation, Self-Determination and Constitutional Change
The relationship between belligerent occupation and self-determination is at once
simple and complex. In its external aspect, self-determination reinforces the principles of
territorial integrity, non-intervention, and non-acquisition of territory by force.101 A
people whose state or territory is subject to military occupation is under a form of “alien
domination,”102 and the people are thus the beneficiaries of a right to self-determination.
A military occupation that is not a result of a defensive use of force within the meaning
of Article 51 of the UN Charter, or continues longer than necessary to repel an act of
aggression, violates the population’s right to self-determination and may even be
regarded as an “illegal” occupation.103 Thus, in this simple scenario, the right of selfdetermination is realized when the foreign military forces withdraw and the
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internationally-recognized sovereign of the territory returns.104 There does not seem to be
any requirement that the sovereign be democratically legitimated by a particular standard
in order to resume its control over the territory, provided that it continues to benefit from
wide international acceptance.105 Thus, there was no question that, upon the termination
of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the Emir of Kuwait would resume his position as head
of state and the pre-existing constitutional order would revive.106
Beyond this scenario, however, the relationship between belligerent occupation
and self-determination becomes unclear. A foreign invasion that inaugurates a longrunning armed conflict between foreign-backed proxies and armed resistance groups107
might produce such a lengthy abeyance of internationally-recognized sovereign authority
that the withdrawal of the foreign forces cannot be equated with the realization of selfdetermination. Yet, as we have seen, the principles of self-determination provide little
guidance on what should happen at that moment beyond an indeterminate and highly
flexible notion that the new order should benefit from the consent of the people or
“representatives” of the people.
In fact, the political reality of such a scenario will mostly likely be that the
withdrawal of foreign troops will occur in parallel to a mediated or arbitrated agreement
between the major armed groups, leading to a political settlement followed by
elections.108 But to speak of such arbitrated processes as self-determination is only to
highlight the flexibility of the notion of popular sovereignty underlying the legal
principle. In the “arbitrated elections” model, self-determination is deemed realized by
“free and fair elections” of a new government, after an interim period of “representative”
government composed of representatives of the key armed groups and factions. The
“representativeness” of the interim government is not the representation characteristic of
democratic legitimation,109 but of the effective sociological legitimacy (namely, the
capacity to mobilize a portion of the populace and deploy fighters) that the armed groups
have by virtue of their military success as partisans.110 Their incumbency in turn gives
them considerable influence and leverage in subsequent electoral contests. The people’s
“choice” in such contexts is thus a choice among leaders bequeathed by the legacy of
armed conflict, rather than any notional “market” in policies and political values.
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Nevertheless, one implication of the “arbitrated elections” model of selfdetermination after belligerent occupation – at least as practiced in Afghanistan and
Cambodia – is that a prerequisite for the process is the departure of the invading foreign
troops (which may be replaced by a peacekeeping force agreed upon by all parties to the
settlement).111 Hence, it may be concluded that, in the context of a foreign invasion, the
complete withdrawal of the invading foreign forces is a precondition for the “realization”
of self-determination if not a sufficient condition.
Maintaining the scenario in which no internationally-accepted sovereign can
resume authority over the territory, what if the invading foreign forces, as belligerent
occupiers, claim the authority to facilitate or assist the territorial population’s selfdetermination? Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prevents an occupier from
asserting the non-applicability of the Convention on the grounds that the occupier has
annexed the territory, or because its presence has been “agreed to” by local authorities
that the occupier itself has created.112 As the commentary observes, this article does not
of itself prohibit the creation of new institutions, but is a protective measure to ensure that
an occupied population is not deprived of its protections under occupation law by virtue
of agreements between those institutions (or the former government) and the belligerent
occupier.113 Thus, the claim that Article 47 implies respect for the underlying
population’s right to self-determination and sovereignty, seems to go to far. Article 47 is
not a clear prohibition on creating a proxy government or new political institutions; it
rather limits the legal competence of these new institutions to terminate the state of
occupation. As the Commentary points out, the principal source of the rule against
fundamental legislative and institutional change is not Article 47 but Article 43 of the
Hague Regulations and Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Conventions. Do either of these
provisions permit the occupier to engage in political transformation in the name of
facilitating or promoting the occupied population’s right to self-determination?
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations requires a belligerent occupant to respect,
“unless absolutely prevented,” the laws in force in the occupied territory. This obligation
is paired with the obligation to “re-establish and insure,” as far as possible, public order
(la vie publique in the French text) and safety. The legislative competence of the
occupying power was expanded somewhat by Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, which acts as lex specialis to the more general obligation in Article 43 of the
Hague Regulations.114 Article 64 authorizes the occupying power to alter the laws in
force in order to fulfill its other duties under the Fourth Geneva Convention, to maintain
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the orderly government of the territory, or to ensure the security of the occupying power.
There is some acceptance that Article 64 provides the occupying power with leeway to
amend or repeal existing laws in order to ensure that it does not violate its own human
rights and humanitarian law obligations (by, for example, enforcing a law that permits
torture or inhuman treatment, or which mandates racial discrimination).115 But this does
not permit the occupier to transform the entire political and legal order in the name of
implementing human rights standards; at most, a case could be made that the occupier is
entitled to abolish an existing legal order because the legal order as a whole so embodies
the political principles of the defeated enemy, that its de jure continuity represents a
threat to the security of the occupier.116 Some doubt whether the occupier could really go
so far,117 but those who accept this possibility acknowledge that, even if the occupier
could retrench the entire legal order, it is not authorized to devise the means of replacing
it.118 The occupier might legislate to ensure the right to be free from torture, but cannot
legislate to “implement” the population’s right to self-determination through the creation
of a new order: “[this right] is too closely linked to the wishes of the people and the ways
in which this right can be satisfied are too manifold. Some would say that the very fact of
occupation is incompatible with the right to self-determination. The best way to respect it
for any occupying power is not to legislate but to withdraw…”119
Thus, when it comes to how an occupier might establish a new political order
after the destruction of an old one, the law of military occupation is silent, in what might
be characterized as an instance of material non-liquet.120 For the most part, the law of
occupation deals with such a possibility by simply prohibiting it, rather than through rules
that regulate but also thereby authorize constitutional transformation. The rationale
behind this preference for prohibitive rather than regulative rules in this area is relatively
easy to discern: irrespective of an occupying power’s proclaimed benevolent intentions,
in the end the application of law of occupation relies on the auto-interpretation of the
occupier, who is very unlikely to be subject to review by some higher instance with
compulsory authority. The occupier’s interpretation of its powers is not subject to real
challenge or revision while the occupation lasts. Thus, any expansion of the occupier’s
legislative competence may greatly expand the real, effective, scope of the occupier’s
discretionary powers, and simultaneously expand the range of intermediate steps that the
occupier might take in order realize its expanded aims. If the transformation of a
territory’s political order – or even the facilitation of such transformation121 – is brought
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within the range of objectives authorized by international law, the distinction between the
limited and unlimited legislative authority of the occupier will be very difficult to
maintain, and the line between sovereign and non-sovereign powers will also blur.
The practice of the Security Council in its authorization of various “statebuilding” missions has not filled this gap in the law, because it has not purported to
override or amend – even implicitly – the law of belligerent occupation.122 Rather, UN
state-building has proceeded along a parallel track of case-by-case authorization through
Security Council resolutions, predicated on the (substantive or formal) consent of parties
to the conflict in the territory.123 As such, UN missions are not belligerent occupations
within the meaning of the laws of war – even though in contexts such as the Congo
(1960-64), Somalia (1992-95), Haiti (1994-2000, 2004-), East Timor (1999-2002, 2006)
and Kosovo (1999-) some phases of the operations were in substance very similar to
belligerent occupations (foreign military presence, combat operations, and a lesser or
greater degree of direct involvement in governmental activities).124 Hence, while it may
be argued that this practice has given rise to a nascent policy idea of “humanitarian
occupation”125 outside of the pre-existing legal institution of occupatio bellica, it cannot
be said that the law of belligerent occupation has somehow changed to include means for
constitutional transformation in the name of instituting liberal democracy or some other
desired political order. Moreover, the Security Council’s resolutions in each of these
cases incorporate different modalities of establishing new political regimes, depending on
the “facts on the ground” as encountered by the relevant mission. For example, the
Resolution (1999) establishing the United Nations Transitional Administration in East
Timor – one of the most comprehensive state-building missions, endowed with plenary
executive, legislative and judicial authority – simply authorizes the mission to create
“capacity for self-government” and to “consult and cooperate” with the East Timorese
people “with a view to the development of local democratic institutions.”126 By contrast,
Resolution 745 (1992) creating the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
decided that it was “vital” that general elections be held in Cambodia by May 1993,
reflecting the underlying agreement by the warring parties to a procedure that involved
election of a Constituent Assembly responsible for drafting a new Constitution.127 In the
interim, UNTAC would administer the state administration created during the rule of the
Vietnamese-installed Hun Sen.128
Part III: What is a State and How Do We Make One? State-Building, Democratic
Legitimacy and the Problems of Political Order
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If the Security Council practice – and associated policy literature produced by the
Secretariat – can be said to crystallize something, it is perhaps the idea that “democracy”
(largely undefined) is a palliative method for the resolution of the political conflicts
underlying the conflicts giving rise to the intervention.129 The repeated association of
“peace” and “democratization” (understood as multiparty elections and formally
democratic institutions) in the repertoire of the Security Council has been extrapolated in
the Secretariat’s policy literature into an equation of “state-building” with “democracybuilding,” with “peace-building.” Building (liberal) democratic institutions is posited as
both the means to and terminus ad quem of successful state-building after severe internal
conflict.130 The underlying sources of the conflict that precipitated the intervention were
diagnosed in terms of “state weakness” or “state-failure,” which in turn was understood
as flowing from a lack of democratic legitimacy on the part of the prior state institutions:
“A consensus emerged among Security Council member states and in the Secretariat that
democratic institutions could effectively address the causes of civil war.”131 Democratic
legitimacy was seen as the form of legitimation most needed for new, “post-conflict”
institutions. In the context of Cambodia, Lise Howard notes that “since the UN and most
of the interested external parties defined the basic problem causing the war as one of
institutional legitimacy, elections were seen to be the best way to install a more legitimate
government.”132
Institutions designed along liberal democratic lines and legitimated through
democratic procedures were considered the surest foundations for “cooperative politics”
because of their basis in the consent of the population, expressed through electoral
mechanisms (election, referenda, etc). Liberal democratic institutions were thus assumed
to have a propensity for self-stabilization over time,133 because their embedded values
and procedures required cooperative mediation of different interests – thus preventing a
return to conflict by aggrieved parties. Participatory governance will “help warring
parties to move their political and economic struggles into an institutional framework
where a peaceful settlement process can be engaged …”134 A contractarian ideal of
political order is sometimes invoked, in which state failure is attributed to the state’s poor
governance (corruption, human rights violations, lack of democratic legitimacy) and the
resultant inability of the state to uphold its end of the purported social contract between
government and governed. The return of order thus requires a renewal of this “contract”
by establishing participatory governance and enhancing inhabitants “ownership” over
state institutions – where ownership seems to imply some kind of rationalized, cognitive
129

For further elaboration, see Nehal Bhuta, “Against State-Building”, 2008, Constellations, Vol. 13.
See Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace; and Kofi Annan, “No Exit without Strategy: Security Council
decision-making and the closure or transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” S/2001/391
(2001) p.2; Cogen and Brabandere, 669.
131
Fox 2008, p. 46. See further Bhuta, Against State-Building.
132
Howard, p.138. See also William Maley, “Democracy and Legitimation: Challenges in the
Reconstitution of Political Processes in Afghanistan” in Hilary Charlesworth, Brett Bowden and Jeremy
Farrall, eds, The Role of International Law in Rebuilding Societies After Conflict, 2009, Cambridge UP
forthcoming.
133
Some “realists” concede that these institutions may have to be staffed and or supported by international
personnel for some indeterminate period of time before they can take root, but on the assumption that the
endogenous characteristics of the institutions will eventually lead them to become stable and effective. An
example of this kind of argument is Paris, At War’s End.
134
SG Report 2001. See also Agenda for Democratization, para 17-18.
130

consent to the political institutions of government, which can be engendered when these
institutions act in accordance with good governance norms such as transparency,
efficiency, rule-following and due process.135
The political theory of contemporary state-building, then, contains several interconnected (but incompletely articulated) claims. One is that a state order should be
conceived in terms of (or sometimes is equated with) formal institutions of governance,
authorized and defined by laws (including a fundamental law, such as a constitution). A
second is that democratic legitimacy (or, more accurately, that form of legitimacy
generated by various electoral procedures) is effective for the purposes of stabilizing new
institutions.136 A concrete state order is expected to flow from the effective application of
normative principles of a certain kind to the design of that order’s institutions. If this is
right, then would-be state-builders or transformative occupiers should seek ways to
maximize the generation of democratic legitimacy,137 in particular when overseeing the
production of the territory’s constitution or basic law. This would strengthen the case for
a “jus post-bellum” that binds the transformative occupier to a strategy of maximizing
democratic procedures in the selection of institutional design mechanisms. For example,
a directly elected constituent assembly could be mandated by international law as the
preferred means of creating the body tasked with writing the constitution, on the grounds
that it is this body which is most likely to be perceived as “legitimate” and therefore
capable of creating a new political order, expressed in the form of the constitution.
The question immediately arises, however: is this an appropriate way to
understand how a new political order is founded and stabilized? Is it an appropriate
understanding of political order itself? Some of the claims for liberal democratic
institutions that are made in the literature on “post-conflict reconstruction” fit Samuel
Huntington’s description of “Webbism,” a tendency to ascribe to a political system
qualities which are assumed to be its ultimate goals rather than qualities which actually
characterize how it functions.138 Successful and entrenched liberal democratic institutions
may well mediate or displace social conflict in ways that contain or sublimate violent
disorder, but it is difficult to disentangle the direction of causality between institutional
stabilization and conflict mediation. Does the institution attain stability and become a
venue for “normal” politics because it induces cooperation between powerful social
forces, or is it because those forces have established a modus vivendi – for exogenous
reasons – that an institution survives and functions at all?139 Merely designing an
institution along liberal democratic lines is no guarantee that it will generate the political
behaviour characteristics of liberal democratic politics.140
What, then, is the relationship between “state” and “institution” and between
“constitution-making” and “state-making”? This is in part an empirical question, but it is
also a question of political theory: what theoretical vantage point clarifies what we do
135
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when we “make” a state? What notions of “legitimacy” are at work? While the statebuilding literature tends to equate state and constitution, and state and institutions, reexamining the relationships between these phenomena holds out a promise of telling us
something about the proper role of legal norms in creating new political orders. In turn, it
helps answer the question posed by this paper – should international law prescribe rules
for constitutional transformation as part of a jus post bellum?
A. Founding New States – An Old Problem in Political Theory
The post-conflict “state-building” literature’s conflation of “state-making” and
“institution-making” is potentially misleading. Certainly, no state order can exist without
institutions; in this sense, Kelsen is right to say that the concept of state presupposes a
valid legal order authorizing the ruler functioning as an instance of the state.141 But
merely creating institutions through legal enactments cannot amount to a concrete state
order. A fundamental characteristic of any existing state order is effective power,
manifested in the successful capacity to dominate a territory and population, and thereby
enforce commands.142 The authority claimed for this effective power is predicated on a
claim to legitimacy, but only if the claim is successful (that is, acquiesced in143) can
effective power translate into stable domination – a state capable of consistently
maintaining its power and authority. In the stabilization of a state order, cognitive,
voluntaristic “consent” of each and every subject to the claimed authority for the exercise
of power is less significant than the empirically general acquiescence of the population in
the means by which power is exercised and commands enforced (or permissions
granted).144
A state is necessarily a normative order, in the sense that the exercise of power is
based on a claim to authority articulated through norms deemed valid. But in the last
instance, as even Kelsen (despite his efforts to banish the dualism of state and law)145
accepted, the validity of a state order qua legal order depends upon a social-political
order146 that is “by and large efficacious.”147 In a normative sense, the state qua legal
order derives its validity from the basic norm. Famously, the basic norm is not a law and
141
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is not created in a legal procedure by a law-creating organ. Thus, it is not a constitutional
law.148 Rather, the basic norm is a place-holder for the factual, historical reality by which
a political order established itself as simultaneously efficacious and legitimate; “validity”
and “efficacy” converge on a single point, the basic norm, which has the somewhat
magical quality of combining normativity and facticity within itself: it is empiricotranscendental. The basic norm validates the legal order, not because it embodies some
higher reason or democratically-authorized consent, but because its content is
“determined by the facts through which an order is created and applied, to which the
behaviour of the individuals regulated by this order, by and large, conforms.”149 The
successful creation of a new state order is thus coextensive with a new basic norm and a
new legal order but crucially, the very idea of a new basic norm implies an efficacious
order of supremacy and subordination – the successful generalization of coercive rules,
which become valid norms by virtue of the success of those who create the new order:
It is … irrelevant whether or not this replacement [of the old order] is effected through a violent
uprising against those who individuals who so far have been the “legitimate” organs competent to
create and amend the legal order. It is equally irrelevant whether the replacement is effected
through a movement emanating from the mass of the people, or through action from those in
government positions. …
… If they succeed, if the old order ceases, and the new order begins to be efficacious … this order
is considered as a valid order. It is now according to this new order that the actual behaviour of
individuals is interpreted as legal or illegal. But this means that a new basic norm is
150
presupposed.

The question of how or in what circumstances a new order of supremacy and
subordination emerges and stabilizes itself is of little interest for Kelsen. Because a
juristic analysis of the state presupposes the “by and large” successful consolidation of
power in the name of the state, it focuses on the immanent logic of the norms through
which state power is transmitted and reinforced. But Kelsen’s terse account of what is
implied by the change of basic norm does point us towards an important insight: that in
the liminal period between one order and another, the distinction between coercive power
and legitimate authority is blurry. And, that in contexts of radical institutional
transformation – such as revolutions or transformative occupation – subordination and
legitimation are two sides of the same coin. The problem of all revolutions is the problem
that new institutions – however legitimate from some abstract normative standpoint – are
“built on quicksand”151 unless the new claim of political authority is imbricated with
effective power; during these times “power-and-authority” is a kind of composite, a
sociological datum that fuses facticity (the capacity to coerce, compel or oblige) with
validity (the authority to legitimate, rationalize, or normalize). Creating new orders is a
precarious and highly uncertain balancing act between the capacity to rule and the
vindication of the claim to rule; mere force without authority engenders only expediency
and a contingent modus vivendi, but normative claims without the capacity to
subordinate become empty (and short-lived) philosophizing.
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It is this composite of “power-and-authority” that underlies Weber’s sociological
notion of legitimacy. Custom, convention and habit successfully coordinate and regulate
action because they fuse ‘is’ (this is how we do things here) with ‘ought’ (this is how we
ought to do things). While the philosopher is right to observe that this is a logical fallacy,
for Weber it is nonetheless a sociological phenomenon: “In consequence of the constant
recurrence of a certain pattern of conduct, the idea might arise in the minds of the
guarantors of a particular norm, that they are confronted with … a legal obligation
requiring enforcement. … Particularly in the field of the internal distribution of power
among organs of an institutional order, experience reveals a continuous scale of
transitions from norms of conduct guaranteed by mere convention to those which are
regarded as binding and guaranteed by law. … It should be clear that, from the point of
view of sociology, the transitions from mere usage to convention and from it to law are
fluid.”152 There can be no rigid distinction between the validity and lack of validity of a
given order;153 really-existing social orders can engender a belief in their validity by
virtue of their capacity to normalize (regularize, reproduce) certain patterns of conduct:
“the mere fact of the regular recurrence of certain events somehow confers on them the
dignity of oughtness.”154
Famously, Weber differentiated between different ideal types of legitimate
domination (rational, traditional and charismatic), each characterized also by a
corresponding pure type of authority (i.e. mode of legitimation) when successful.155 What
all these forms of domination and authority have in common is that, at a higher level of
generality, they comprise specific kinds of sociological legitimacy that are historically
discernable in the real social orders that Weber studied. In other words, the extent to
which bureaucratic-rational, as opposed to patrimonial or charismatic (religious or
democratic), legitimation succeeds in stabilizing domination is a contingent outcome of
the historical circumstance under consideration. Moreover, in any real historical context,
actual beliefs in the legitimacy of an order and a population’s willingness to acquiesce in
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it, will be composed of different “types” of authority acting together.156 For example,
Weber observes that “in the case of ‘legal authority,’ it is never purely legal. The belief in
legality comes to be established and habitual, and this means it is partly traditional …
Furthermore, it has a charismatic element, at least in the negative sense that persistent and
striking lack of success [in enforcement] may be sufficient to ruin any government, to
undermine its prestige, and to prepare the way for charismatic revolution.”157
Thus, while normative and contractarian approaches to the legitimacy of a
political order understand it as deriving from coherence with normative principles that are
rationally generalizable and (in principle) agreed to by the population subjected to that
order, the historical-sociological approach understands it as a product of a social and
historically-determined context, articulated through historical forms, and not graspable
outside a “given societal and motivational constellation and without an understanding of
its historicity.”158 This is not to deny that states do, and historically always have, framed
the exercise of public power through normative frameworks that appear rationally
justifiable. However, the sociological lens would lead us to be doubtful that such rational
(and rationalizing) theoretical constructions amount to the foundation for a state’s
capacity to authorize domination. Rather, these constructions represent the state’s
successful achievement of legitimate domination, and describe the state’s own account of
its political legitimacy. Of course, to the extent that the state describes itself in
generalizable terms, it provides an account of its functioning that might be tested against
its actual functioning, and thus a vernacular for the contestation of the exercise of
political power.159 Normative frameworks of political philosophy, then, would seem to be
of most significance once a state order is successfully established. The differentiation of
power and legitimacy or facticity and validity presupposes a more-or-less consolidated
order in which the political realm has achieved a degree of autonomy.
But where the old body politic has collapsed or been retrenched, the problem of
legitimacy ceases to be clearly differentiated from power. Arendt makes this point in her
reflections on revolution, where she observes that revolutions are tasked “to establish a
new authority, unaided by custom and precedent and the halo of time immemorial, [and
so] they could not but throw into relief with unparalleled sharpness the old problem … of
the source of and of the origin of power … which would bestow legitimacy upon the
powers that be.”160 An example of the power-and-authority needed to erect new
foundations was, in Arendt’s view, to be found in the Roman understanding of the
coincidence of authority, tradition and religion necessary for the successful founding a
new political order. Inherent in the Roman conception of foundation is the notion that “all
decisive political changes were reconstitutions – reforms of old institutions and the
retrievance of the original act of foundation.” The Roman dictator charged with refounding order was not a “fabricator” of order out of human materiel; he was rather an
156
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augmenter161 of existing sources of authority and power, even as some innovation is
introduced to re-stabilize an order that had fallen out of balance.162
Who or what would be capable of generating or engendering the power-andauthority necessary for such a task? This is a question that Machiavelli, Schmitt and
Arendt all address, and while each posits the answer through a different figure or political
phenomenon (the Prince, the constituent power, the power of joint action), what is
interesting for our purposes here is that each theorist elucidates distinct but
complementary understandings of the challenge of founding new orders.
For Machiavelli, the founding of new orders poses profound epistemological and
practical challenges: it is necessary to understand an opaque and shifting matrix of
forces, modes of legitimation and practices of social power, and to also somehow
repeatedly intervene in this uncertain terrain in order to aggregate power and authority, so
as to stabilize an order of supremacy and subordination.163 The figure who might be able
to successfully establish a new order is the new Prince, but his predicament is very
difficult.164 For Machiavelli, all states are ultimately founded on a primordial act of force,
but the established ruler (principe naturale) can rely on custom, habit and tradition to
maintain the acquiescence of his subjects165 – provided, of course, that he does not act
recklessly and make too many internal enemies or does not suffer from adverse
fortuna.166 The principe naturale benefits from the fact that the people are used to
obeying one of his lineage, so that their inherited responses “operate to legitimate
everything he does, and he must step very far out of line before this conditioned structure
ceases to work in his favour.”167 Implicit in Machiavelli’s contrast of the condition of the
principe naturale with the principe nuovo is the understanding that “use, tradition and
second nature” are essential modes of creating order. The predicament of the new prince
is that he cannot immediately rely upon the historically-determined “second nature” of
the people’s acquiescence in the old order. Instead, he needs extraordinary talent, virtue,
energy and astuteness to be able to recognize the exigencies of the situation, and to act
appropriately to respond to them. This might involve the use of various tactics and
strategies, such as forming alliances and co-opting or eliminating enemies, as well as the
judicious use of symbols, myths and ideology to impress upon subjects the rightness of
one’s rule.168 But Machiavelli’s continuous use of conditional and qualified maxims of
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prudent action reminds us that founding new orders is inherently precarious and
uncertain. Success is “aleatory,” in Althusser’s phrase,169 an unpredictable combination
of fortuna and virtu. The reader of the Prince, addressed as the potential political actor
faced with the task of making a state,170 is constantly denied the possibility of stepping
outside the matrix of forces, partial perspectives and contradictory tendencies; there is no
safe moral or theoretical vantage point from which to obtain a synoptic view of the
terrain, no intrinsic principle or strategy of mastery insulated from change of fortune, and
no escape from the contradictory need to at once maintain allies, marginalize enemies and
win the loyalty of the people.
Historicity, contingency and the relationship between power and authority are
also themes evident in Schmitt’s writing. The specter haunting Schmitt’s conceptions of
state, constitution and the political is that of incipient civil war and state dissolution, and
for this reason his inquiries into the question of who or what might be capable of
producing a new order are relevant to our concerns here. A central question in Schmitt’s
constitutional writings is how to create and stabilize a new state order, in the wake of the
collapse of the old order and in the face of powerful contending social forces, each
seeking to impose their own comprehensive vision of the state. Schmitt’s distinction
between constitution and constitutional law171 directs us to the idea that an effective legal
order leans on or presupposes a concrete state order, a relationship of supremacy and
subordination that is capable of stabilizing institutions, enforcing law and preserving the
unity of the polity against centrifugal political powers.172 This state order exists as an
emanation or expression of “the concrete, collective condition of political unity and
social order of a particular state.”173 A state can never emerge from a “contract,” but only
through the production of a “political unity,” organized around some representative
figure,174 entity or body. The idea of “political unity” in Schmitt is sometimes read as
necessarily volkish or implying ethnic homogeneity, but a careful reading of his
Constitutional Theory175 indicates that for Schmitt, the production of “political unity” is a
contingent, historically-determined process and can be engendered by a variety of actors
and entities, depending on the epoch under consideration. Thus, he comments that “in
most European states, political unity was the work of princely absolutism,”176 a laborious
and centuries long exercise of “overcoming of the legitimacy of the (feudal and estatebased) status quo at that time.”177 The age of democratic revolution wrought a
substitution for who and what could potentially embody political unity in European states
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during the 19th century, replacing the monarch with the people as the “bearer of
constitution-making power.”178
But, like Machiavelli’s new prince, the people as constitution-making power
could no longer rely on the foundations of tradition, religion and custom upon which the
absolutist princes rested their claims of power, authority and representation.179 Instead, in
order to found a state and give it a constitution (in Schmitt’s sense), the people must be a
“politically existing entity … brought to political consciousness and capable of acting.”180
The people as constitution-making power entails a capacity to make an existential,
authoritative decision about the state form; that is, about the “concrete type of supremacy
and subordination, because there is in social reality no order without supremacy and
subordination.”181 One way in which the people attain this capacity is when they
recognize themselves as a politically-existing entity such as “the nation,”182 and some set
of persons or body achieves the real, effective status as the representation of that political
unity: “in every state, there must be persons who can say L’etat c’est nous.”183 The
attainment of this unity and some entity or person’s real, effective ability to claim to
represent this unity, are the contingent outcomes of historical and social forces; a
“nation” cannot be brought into existence by an electoral procedure, and no “normative
event, process or procedure” can ensure “representation” in the sense that Schmitt means
here.184 Rather, as he observes in the case of France, the political reality of “the nation”
as invoked against the King by the revolutionaries of 1789 “arose as a result of the
political determination of the absolute monarchy”… “Historically, [France’s political
existence as a nation] first became possible after France had become a state unity through
the absolute monarchy…”185 The National Assembly’s claim to represent the people was
only partially effective, with King contesting its authority to give a new constitution to
France: “the issue who represented the nation by the issuance of the constitution, the
National Assembly or the King, was a clear question of power …”186
For Schmitt, then, the bearer of the constituent power is the actor or entity whose
“power or authority” is capable of making the “concrete, comprehensive decision over
the type and form of its own political existence.” That is, the constituent power is that
power or authority amounting to a capacity to create and maintain a concrete, collective
condition of political unity and social order, an order of supremacy and subordination.
In his footnote to the phrase “power or authority”, Schmitt comments that “[c]oncepts
such as sovereignty and majesty by necessity always correspond only to effective power.
Authority, but contrast, denotes a profile that rests essentially on the element of
continuity and refers to tradition and duration. Both power and authority are effective and
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vital in every state combined with one another. … According to Victor Ehrenberg …
[authority] denotes something ‘ethical social,’ a position oddly mixed together from
political power and social prestige,’ which ‘rests on and supplements social validity.”187
Schmitt’s stylized notions of “decision” and “political will” create an impression
of instantaneity in the production of political order, a once-and-for-all choice by some
kind of mystical collective subject endowed with constituent power. But his elaborations
make it clear that who or what holds the power or authority required to exercise the
constituent power is an open question: a National Assembly or a Bonaparte might equally
successfully create a new political order in the name of the people, if they succeed in
establishing their representative character and if the people acquiesce.188 Exactly how a
given person or entity acquires this capacity is a question for history, not constitutional
theory.189 Schmitt’s constitutional theory points us towards historical (if highly
stylized)190 types of state order and their corresponding subject of constitution-making
power: the king may be the bearer of constitution-making power (in a monarchy), as may
be a circle of certain families or a minority (in an aristocracy or oligopoly).191 The
potential of the people as constitution-making power rests on the historical emergence of
the people as category capable of – viz. bearing the necessary power and authority – to
produce a new order. But this emergence also brings with specific crises of ordermaintenance and order-production, flowing from the dissolution of the sinews of custom,
tradition and habit that stabilized earlier orders; constitution-making in the epoch of the
people as constitution-making power is precarious and the sources of power-andauthority fragile.192 How do we know who is capable of making good on their claim,
“L’etat c’est nous”? Only an understanding of the concrete situation in that territory and
society – the balance of forces, the modes of social power and sociological legitimacy,
the means of forming political will – can help us to answer that question. One
implication of this reading of Schmitt is that successful creation of a new order requires
the identification of the loci and sources of effective social power in any particular time
and place.
Arendt also recognized the difficulties of creating political order where the people
have replaced the king as constituent power. In On Revolution, she contrasts the
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American revolution’s success in establishing a stable order with the French revolution’s
predicament that “none of [the revolution’s] constituent assemblies could command
enough authority to lay down the law of the land.”193 The historical consequence of
absolutism in France, according to Arendt, was to bequeath operative concepts of power
and authority shaped in the image of the absolutist king: the king’s will “was source of
both law and power – thus, the law was made powerful and power made legitimate.”194
When “the nation” was substituted for the king as the constituent power, “the old
understanding of power and authority … almost automatically led the new experience of
power to be channeled into concepts which had just been vacated.”195 But absolutism had
“clouded the risk of founding modern orders” because it had been able to rely upon the
heredity institution of kingship and its foundations in a mix of custom, tradition and
religion. This solution was not available to the new constituent power in France,
unmasking what Arendt calls “the most elementary predicament of all modern political
bodies, their profound instability …”196 The will of the multitude was a “quicksand” that
could stabilize a new order only when “someone was willing to take the burden or the
glory of dictatorship upon himself.”197 1789 leads inexorably to Bonaparte and his
plebiscites.
Arendt’s diagnosis of the dynamics of order-creation here comes strikingly close
to Schmitt’s: the people as constituent power must solve the problems of power, authority
and representation if they are to succeed in creating a new order. But if both Arendt and
Schmitt recognize Bonapartist plebiscitary dictatorship as one possible outcome of this
vortex, Arendt clearly regards it as a pathological result, revealing the tragic historicallyconditioned risks of modern political forms. In the American revolution, she finds an
alternative historical experience that gave rise to the requisite forms of power and
authority to consolidate the new order. She notes that the legacy of English monarchical
authority in America was readily distinguishable from that of the Bourbons: “[T]he
American revolution grew out of a conflict with a limited monarchy … the King had
already relinquished potestas legibus soluta one hundred years earlier.”198 What this leads
to is a very different historical determinacy for the operative concepts of power and
authority. Political power was already organized into “authorized political bodies, which
were the agents of the state after the Revolution – they seized state power through and on
behalf of their districts, countries and townships.” Indeed, according to Arendt, the
historical experience of the colonists and the influence of the philosophy of
“covenanting” among the puritans engendered a distinct reality of power arising through
joint action. This power was institutionalized through the constitution of provinces, cities,
and towns over 150 years, and these were states-in-waiting, endowed with modes of
effective authority and power. While I recognize that Arendt seeks to move beyond the
particular experience of the colonists to formulate a more general notion of “power” as a
“human attribute,” her account in On Revolution is so closely tied to the historicity of the
American colonists’ experience that it seems difficult to posit the possibility of this
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notion of power as a real, effective force, independent of substantially similar historical
trajectory.
The purpose of reviewing these diverse theorists’ accounts of foundings is to
point to an alternative – and more complex – theory of constituting new political orders
than that presupposed by the contemporary practice of “state-building.” Despite deep
differences in normative vision, Machiavelli, Weber, Kelsen, Schmitt and Arendt can be
read as diagnosing certain elements that characterize the situation of founding new
orders. A common strand to their diagnoses is the historical determination of the sources
and bases of order, and the contingency and diversity of the modes of successful
legitimation. Equally, they share an understanding of the inextricable – perhaps even
mutually constitutive – connection between effective power and successful legitimation
during these founding periods and processes, in which facticity and validity, coercion and
consent, are blurred. From this theoretical vantage point, the legitimation provided
through democratic or plebiscitary procedures (referenda, assemblies, elections) is only
one possible mode of successful legitimation within a given historical situation and
territorial space; it will not necessarily be the most significant or relevant one, and may
well be marginal to the specific modes of power-and-authority at work.
B. Constitutions and the Problem of Order
“Constitution-making” in such a context entails more than one meaning. One is
the drafting and promulgation of a legal document of superior normativity that regulates
and facilitates the production, regulation and application of state power. But if it is to be
more than a piece of paper, this document also “leans on” or presupposes a material order
of social and political power – one that can be manifested in innumerable concrete social
forms, practices, loci and legitimacies.199 Thus, the second meaning of “constitutionmaking” here is the coordination and augmentation of these nodes of power-andauthority to be able to produce a (more or less) articulated political order across the
territory and population.
Schmitt famously introduced the distinction between constitution and
constitutional law, in a way that highlighted the dependence of public law on an
underlying, effective, political order (in his distinctive conception, a concrete political
unity); a constitutional law that did not somehow represent the substance of this order
would fail to be authentically constitutional.200 Conversely, merely introducing a new
constitutional law or transforming an existing basic law will be irrelevant unless it is a
result of a transformation in the sources and nature of power, authority and representation
in the political life of that state.201 Thus, “it would be incorrect to claim that through a
‘simple majority decision of Parliament,’ England could be changed into a soviet
republic.”202
Schmitt’s account of how a new political order is founded in the modern epoch
takes as its arche the experience of French revolutionary founding, understood as an
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existential political choice by the people-qua-constituent power. But the capacity of the
people to wield the constituent power – in the sense of being able to enforce and
authorize an effective political order – is contingent, and Schmitt tells us little about how
an effective order might emerge in the context of other peoples and territories.
Nevertheless, his distinction between order-creating power and legal form, and his
emphasis on acquiescence rather than “consent,” steer us towards a concern to locate the
sources of effective power-and-authority as the building blocks for the new order. In this
sense, it is a “realist” perspective that is compatible with Russell Hardin’s rational-choice
inflected arguments about the nature of constitutions.203 Hardin’s constitution is not a
“contract” based on consent to justifiable reasons, but an arrangement that coordinates
the interests of those groups in society powerful enough to significantly disrupt order. A
“constitution” in this sense establishes conventions that make it easier for us to cooperate
and coordinate; once it is in place, other kinds of problems may be regulated in the
context of a background order that is maintained by sufficient force to make its
commands credible.204
A political order will successfully stabilize where the constitutional arrangements
it guarantees are sufficiently advantageous to sufficiently powerful or politically effective
parts of the population, for them to coordinate their interests along those arrangements;
politically ineffective groups or parts of the population can be “overrun and ignored” as
long as enough of those who are effective acquiesce to the coordination order. In this
sense, “might” can “make right,”205 where recoordinating on a new arrangement implies
such conflictual disorder (and a possible failure to recoordinate at all) that the current
state of affairs generates acquiescence in enough of the population to raise the costs of
recoordination even more.206 In this way, coordination on order moves from mere modus
vivendi between powerful groups, to a more sustainable self-enforcing set of
arrangements – provided, of course, the capacity to enforce the arrangements against
politically marginal dissenters exists.207
Hardin is not necessarily sanguine about the prospects for successful coordination
in any given case. More often than not, coordination orders emerge through unintended
consequences and path-dependent historical trajectories. The probability that such an
order will be a liberal constitutionalist order seems smaller still. Rational design might
play some part in the successful perpetuation of a coordination order along liberal
constitutionalist lines, but this will ultimately depend on whether the nature of the
(historically and socially-determined) interests of powerful segments of the population
are actually amenable to coordination along liberal constitutionalist designs, and in
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addition, whether each segment perceives (or misperceives) its interests in a way that
makes coordination and acquiescence possible. Hence, in the context of US constitutionmaking, Hardin observes that “coordination on the US constitution may have required
failures of foresight that gave the constitution a chance … Had the conventioneers known
what the government would do, they may not have been able to coordinate … Alas,
whether we can coordinate is largely a matter of luck.”208
Hardin’s account of constitutions also clarifies the relative place of democratic
legitimacy in the production and stabilization of new political orders. If political order
arises out of successful coordination among politically effective groups, it is not
necessary that “democratic legitimacy” will be the only or even the primary vector of
“political effectiveness”. Democratic procedures may fail to select those wielding other
relevant kinds of social power. Proceduralized “consent” to the election of a constituent
assembly may not adequately organize the forms of interest and power necessary to
facilitate coordination and acquiescence.209 Indeed, under conditions of ethnic or sectbased political conflict and mobilization, it may sharpen perceptions of conflicting
interests between the relevant groups.210 (Ironically, one of the structural conditions
conducive to successful coordination may well be that bargaining representatives wield
strong, monopolistic (non-democratic) power over the groups or factions that they
represent). It may be, as Hardin contends, that democracy works best as a decisionmethod at the margins of deep political conflict but not where there is not already some
background of rough coordination on order.211
One implication of this kind of account of constitutions and the conditions of their
efficacy is that one would expect the mechanisms through which constitutional
documents are drafted, and the kinds of “political goods” they embrace, to reflect the
interests of politically effective groups and the concrete dilemmas of coordination and
conflict faced at the time. To the extent that constitutions do not stand in some
relationship to these concerns, they will fail to coordinate effective power. For example,
Nathan Brown’s study of Arab constitutions and constitution-making finds that Arab
constitutions throughout the 19th and 20th centuries display a concern for augmenting
state power, often through the organization and institutionalization of state authority. In
the 19th century, constitutions principally arose through intra-elite bargains and aimed at
re-organizing and rationalizing state power in order to resist imperial penetration. In the
twentieth century, constitutions augmented state power and institutionalized nationalist
political parties as means of consolidating political control and independence after
imperial rule. 212 These constitutions did not encode liberal constitutional goods of limited
government or subjective right, but this did not mean that they were merely ideological
documents either: “Arab constitutions have never been routinely violated facades or mere
pieces of paper unconnected with political reality … Arab regimes generally operate
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within plausible interpretations of constitutional texts … The question is not whether the
constitution will be enforced but whose interpretation of it will be authoritative.”213
Arab constitutions were not written in order to serve liberal constitutionalist ends,
but nevertheless did in some cases become the basis for a constitutionalist practice of
contesting and restraining state power as a by-product of other conflicts that were
channeled through constitutional arrangements.214 Brown reminds us that even in the
context of recent European history (which often serves as the implicit normative model
for constitutional forms),215 the emphasis on intention, design and rationality in
constitution-making overlooks the extent to which nineteenth century constitutions were
“not abstract attempts to construct government based on reason. They were compromise
documents among monarchists, aristocrats, liberals and democrats … they were not
expressions of the ‘people’s will’ as much as pacts made among antagonistic political
forces or promises made by monarchs to forestall revolution by agreeing to a measure of
political participation.”216 Constitutions aimed at preserving or re-making order can over
time become a real basis for constitutionalist practices, but only if the survive the
immediate circumstances of their own creation and “escape from, rather than reflect
authors’ [empirical] wills.”217
The problem of coordination between politically effective groups will be most
severe where society is divided among groups with strongly conflicting interests or
programs. The conflicting interests may track ethnic or religious divisions, or entrenched
economic and social interests (as they did in the U.S. Civil War), or some combination of
both. Yet it is precisely in these kinds of situations that internationally-supervised or
mandated “constitution-making” will occur, where no single group has “won” the
conflict.218 In those circumstances, constitutions are most likely to be “bargains” and least
likely to be coherent political visions.219 The challenge will be to find points over which
the constituent groups220 can successfully coordinate in order to provide a background
order for the stabilization of new institutions. Bargaining towards points of coordination
is not the same as “deliberation,” and need not be an exercise of “public reason.” While
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liberal constitution-making theorists make a virtue of necessity by arguing that groups
seeking their own interests will nevertheless feel compelled to frame their claims in
“public interest” terms (and so be subjected to the “civilizing force of hypocrisy”),221
Brown points out that this a highly idealized understanding of how bargaining transpires
in real constitution-making processes.222 Real actors will not be confident in their
assessment of other parties’ relative strength or even the strength of allies; calculations
will be tentative and shift rapidly along with the situation; the distinction between shortterm and long-term interest, or between “private” and “public” concern will be hard to
maintain with any clarity: “participants view the future through a gauzy veil of confusion
rather than a totally opaque veil of ignorance … [M]uch of the bargaining and reasoning
that does take place is extremely bad.”223 Constitution-making which occurs
simultaneously with making new political orders is less about the “public good” and
more about hard bargaining over interests.
For this reason, as Horowitz suggests, it is difficult to meaningfully speak of
constitutional “design” under such conditions, and third parties need to be aware of the
limits of their assessment of what it is rational for the parties to do from an external point
of view: “In some ways, the most dangerous people in a negotiation are third parties,
those with only detachment to offer. Anything a third party facilitator can point to in
order to induce moderation is probably already discounted in the conflict.”224 One
consequence of this caution is a skepticism about overly prescriptive rules or too rigid an
insistence on particular norms that should govern the process.225 A demand that certain
political goods be part of any “good” constitution, or the claim that a democratic
constitutional process is “necessary” to the “legitimacy” of the end result,226 may simply
be inapt to the particular forms of legitimacy at work between different constituent
groups within a population, and dysfunctional to the bargaining problems they confront.
To take one example offered by Brown, while publicity and transparency are powerful
values in abstracto, “publicity may not deliver what is expected … Political leaders
speaking in public often seek to appeal to and mobilize their own constituencies far more
than they work to persuade opponents. They may seek to do so in ways that avoid
alienating others, but just as often they may find that alienating others helps mobilize
their own constituency.”227
An obvious question raised by this account of constitutions and constitutionmaking is how a modus vivendi negotiated by constituent groups becomes entrenched and
stabilized. One outcome of a constitution-making process that looks to coordinate mutual
advantage among politically effective groups could well be a temporary “peace” among
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warlords which will collapse as soon as the balance of forces shifts.228 This prospect
cannot be ruled out, and underscores the difficulty of any attempt to simultaneously
resolve the problem of order and establish institutions regulating the exercise of political
power. But it is also doubtful whether any one model or set of normative commitments
could alleviate those deep difficulties.229 The regulative horizon of this “realist” idea of
order-formation and constitution-making is not the reasoned persuasion of the relevant
actors concerning some concept of “public good,” but a learning process that engenders
political practices which mitigate or displace deep conflicts sufficiently to avert the
collapse of order: forming alliances, crafting moderate coalitions, developing crosscutting constituencies230 and so forth. The challenge for the realist ideal is to somehow
arrive at political mechanisms of moderation which, over time, raise the costs of recoordination. Under such circumstances, the constitution might become sufficiently
“sticky” to emerge as a basis for constitutionalist practice. In this sense, one dictum of the
“peace-building” literature is quite right: external actors may have to act forcefully to
reinforce a fragile order in the hope that it will become self-enforcing over time. But in
contrast to authors such as Paris,231 the theoretical vantage point elaborated above
suggests that there is nothing in the form of institutions per se that will conduce to selfstabilization unless they can become focal points for coordination between the relevant
constituent groups to a sufficient degree to engender acquiescence among the
preponderance of the population. Normality engenders normalization, and maybe the
possibilities for greater justice.232
Part IV. International Law, Inter-public Law and State-Making: A Common Realism?
I have labeled the theoretical perspective developed in Part III as “realist”. This is
because it places the problem of order (how to achieve it and maintain it) at the heart of
constitution-making and state-making. It is concerned to find ways of assimilating and
moderating deep conflict between social forces or groups, rather than aspire to abstract
values of justice. It suggests that during times of order-formation after radical disorder,
operative concepts of “power” and “authority” or “force” and “legitimacy” are not easily
distinguishable, such that one must look to the forms and sources of social power in a
given context in order to also identify the forms of legitimacy that can be harnessed. The
actors and social forces who have the power to rule over the population (or part of it), and
the means of legitimating that rule, are those whose mutual advantage must be
coordinated if there is to be a chance at the long-term stabilization of the new
constitutional and state order.
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In his essay on the political theological origins of early American realism in
international political thought, Nicolas Guilhot points out that mid-century realism was a
“situated response” to the utopianism of inter-war liberalism.233 Realist thinkers sharply
distinguished between individual morality and the necessities of politics in part to
underscore their understanding of politics as essentially conflictual and not adequately
grasped in terms of absolute standards of good and evil. The aim of politics was a
modicum of peace, in order to allow “progress towards civitas dei.” The battle against the
chaos and disorder “knows only limited victories.” The realist insistence on the material
dimensions of power emphasized both human finitude and the finite nature of the
political.234 I would suggest that these ways of thinking about politics and conflict are
familiar to international law,235 and indeed are a key to understanding its normative and
practical possibilities. Benedict Kingsbury has argued that international law is best
understood neither as a rationalist “law between states” nor as an incipient cosmopolitan
order, but as inter-public law.236 “Inter-public law” emerges from a practice of crafting
and preserving law-governed relationships between entities that organize, contain and
generate political power. The principles relevant to this form of law cannot be read off
axiomatically from moral principles, but neither are they mere summaries of power
relations. Rather, the content of these principles reflect the ways and means of crafting
relationships between political entities (states, factions, estates, classes) that represent and
produce public power.237 The challenge for inter-public law is to channel, and thus help
produce, public power at a higher level of spatial generality. Domestically, public law
fulfilled these roles by developing a politically-sensitive method: “The essence of public
law is droit politique. Public law has many gaps and silences to accommodate the
political. In sharp contrast to conceptions of public reason [in deliberative democracy
theories] … the tradition of droit politique argues that the public reason of public law can
not be the moral reason of the community, it can only be political reason of state. The
method of public law is prudential, favoring analogical reasoning, casuistry … and
creates a type of knowledge that is not easily generalizable. It is the method of the
trimmer.”238
The “gaps and silences” of international law qua inter-public law reflects the
political problematic that it confronts: conflicting principles of legitimacy in a
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heterogeneous political space, the shadow of violence, and problem of generating
sustainable order. This set of problems also inheres in the “constitutional politics” of
foundation or moments of radical political breakdown or transformation. At this level,
international law and constitutional law share more than one might expect if one only
takes the vantage point of the settled and stabilized constitutional order.239 Law of this
kind neither “causes” order through compelling rational bases, nor is it only a cipher for
interest. It provides categories and concepts that help contain, articulate and reproduce
practices of order-construction and order-maintenance; as a result, these concepts have a
normative character which seems paradoxical when considered in the abstract. They are
“inside” and “outside” of power, and depending on the concrete political situation, can
vacillate between being an apologia for power and pure norm.240 But it seems that this
propensity to maintain a balance between fact and norm – to transmit the “normative
power of the factual” (Jellinek) but also simultaneously constitute the grammar for the
intelligibility and articulation of factual power – is key to the normativity of international
law, and also to understanding its possibilities and limits.241
If my theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between “statemaking” and “constitution-making” (Part III) is persuasive, then I think it suggests that
this is one area in which international law does, and should continue to, maintain a
silence. That is, these circumstances are exactly those to which the droit politique
character of international law is well-suited. An overly prescriptive rule or norm-based
approach to constitution-making seems unlikely to be functional to the need to induce
politically effective groups to bargain towards points of coordination, given the diverse
forms of “political effectiveness” that may exist in a particular territory and the
contingent conditions that might be conducive to coordination at a particular time. In the
context of peacekeeping and peace-making missions in Africa, Alex de Waal points out
that “if indeed ‘Africa works’, in large part, through neo-patrimony and lineage … [then]
in the patrimonial political market place, the only semi-stable outcome is an inclusive
buy-in of all elites by the best resourced actor in the market place … An institutionalized
state or insurgent can nominate an official with the right position and sufficient authority
to negotiate a peace agreement or implement a ceasefire. The deal can be done
wholesale.”242 The challenge in many contemporary conflicts is precisely to identify
those participants in a conflict who can aggregate micro- and meso-level conflicts
sufficiently to “speak for” a population and bind it to a resolution.243 A norm which
demands a specific form of representation or mode of legitimacy risks demanding that
mediators and peacemakers reach deep into the social and political structures of the
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conflicted territory in order to find the “right” interlocutors; a possible “wholesale” deal
may become “retail” if certain groups are disqualified a priori on normative grounds.
By encoding values connected with a particular ideal of legitimacy, international
law may be counterproductive. Moreover, a specifically liberal democratic model of
constitutional politics, if embedded in international law, may diminish the “inter-public”
character of international law’s normativity by reducing its capacity to accommodate and
integrate different modes of legitimacy and forms of social power “on the ground.” Prior
to the rise of “democratic peace-building,” the practice of UN-sponsored peace
negotiations and the corresponding posture of international law in recognizing the
outcomes, appears to reflect this pragmatic acceptance of inclusion of parties irrespective
of their democratic or human rights credentials.244 In the Cambodia settlement, for
example, the Khmer Rouge’s history of genocidal policies did not disqualify it from a
cardinal role in negotiations and the transitional “representative” government. Nor did the
Khmer Rouge’s participation diminish the willingness of states to recognize the Paris
Accords as legitimate binding documents; when the Khmer Rouge sought to defect from
the settlement, strong international support was provided to the government created under
the Accords. But this implied that the agreements were regarded as binding on the
participating entities, and the latter were to that extent “recognized” as proper parties to
the agreed process. Their recognition as legal quasi-subjects derived from the factual
reality of their political subjectivity and political power:
The international community has … manifested a desire to accept these parties in the context of
political settlements, as capable of binding the communities in whose name they enter into
political settlements. In effect, the warring factions in an internal armed conflict, at least when
they attain a minimum level of organization, influence, and territorial control, are accorded a
limited status as subjects of international law sufficient to enable them to enter into binding legal
agreements with other factions and with outside states and international organizations. Similarly,
leaders of these factions are accepted as the factions’ political representatives regardless of how
245
the leaders achieved their position.

None of this requires an “anything goes” approach; indeed, as argued above, it is quite
compatible with trying to find mechanisms (institutional and programmatic) to moderate
political behaviour so as to reduce conflict and extremist tendencies. International human
rights law and humanitarian law could well still operate within and through a settlement
framework as a means of providing a common vocabulary to frame and negotiate issues
and articulate goals for cooperation, coordination and goal-setting. But this is distinctive
from an approach that demands ex ante conformity and uses rule compliance or noncompliance as a means of disqualifying parties. This is a heuristic which tries to avoid the
occasion of the veto on the grounds of an overly thick concept of political morality.246 It
tries to avoid a sharp conflict between order and justice, not by rationalizing the
complementarity of order and justice at a higher level of abstraction, but by cautiously
mediating the tensions between them. Temporizing, capacious and flexible concepts,
gaps and silences: these are the tools and methods of an inter-public law understanding of
international law’s role in such situations.
244

Note that this need not imply a categorical position in favour of “amnesties” or any specific position in
the relative merits of “peace” versus “justice”. But it does imply that at certain junctures, silence or evasion
of such issues may be preferable.
245
David Wippman, “Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?” University of Chicago Law Review,
Vol 62, 1995, 607-687, p.641-2. (emphasis added).
246
See Martin Wight, “Western Values in International Relations,” pp. 128.

Conclusion
This paper has attempted to answer the question of whether international law does
or should contain rules governing the production of new political orders in territories
under occupation or international administration. The paper first inquired whether the
existing law of self-determination contained any such rules, and concluded that it does
not. Self-determination does contain a kernel of “popular sovereignty” but does not
prescribe either the form or substance of how decisions over the internal political
organization of a territory should be made. Rather, it preserves an agnosticism towards
the sources and nature of political organization, which, I have suggested, is an important
“golden thread” in international law. Second, the paper concluded that the present law of
belligerent occupation similarly does not provide a source of authority or of legal rules
which regulate the transformation of political systems by the occupier, and indeed
maintains a broad prohibition against such transformation. To the extent that political
transformation has been specifically authorized by the Security Council in the “statebuilding” missions of the last 15 years, it is a practice that has developed in parallel to the
existing law of occupation and has not amended that law. The legal basis for Security
Council-authorized state-building lies in the Security Council resolutions themselves.
Should this legal void be filled? In answering this question, I have attempted to
unpack and disaggregate some underlying political theoretical issues. I have argued that
while the normative commitments of contemporary state-building emphasize democratic
legitimacy and liberal democratic institutional forms as the cornerstone of founding and
stabilizing new political orders (and resolving the conflicts that brought about disorder),
an alternative theoretical and sociological perspective provides a better account of
difficulties of order-creation. This account, which is developed through a re-reading of a
number of political theorists whose work addresses the problem of founding new orders,
stresses the mutual imbrication of effective power and legitimacy, and the historical
contingency of who and what can successfully wield the constituent power.
“Constitution-making” under conditions of “state-making” requires means to coordinate
and concentrate effective power, and involves selecting and harnessing the forms of
“power-and-authority” that could successfully establish the fact of rule and the claim of
authority to rule. Unsurprisingly, achieving this coordination and selection is riddled with
uncertainty and problems of knowledge. Success is “aleatory,” an alchemical product of
fortune and virtú.
If this account is right, then it has consequences for the role of legal rules. It
would suggest that rules prescribing specific procedures or modes of legitimation
(requiring, for example, a constituent assembly) would either be marginal or
counterproductive. They would be counterproductive if they have the effect of precluding
inclusion of groups and actors that bear quite different forms of social power. They may
simply select the wrong agents through democratic mechanisms. Alternatively,
democratic mechanisms might work best at the margins (as suggested by Hardin), but
only against a background of rough coordination on order. An overly-prescriptive rulebased ideal of “jus post-bellum” may not be functional to the central dilemmas of
creating new political orders.
Finally, this paper has argued at a normative level that this “silence” in
international law should be read as consistent with an important dimension of
international law’s normativity: it’s character as “inter-public law” and its capacity to

accommodate and mediate diverse forms of historically-conditioned legitimation. This
feature of international law has most often been subject to the criticism that it merely
ratifies extant power relations and makes “might,” “right.” What I have attempted to
argue here is that this aspect of contemporary international law can be understood as
having a distinct normative value, one which derives from a preoccupation with crafting
relations of order horizontally between loci of power. While some see “democratic peacebuilding’s” emphasis on democratic legitimation and liberal democratic institutionbuilding as the harbinger of normative progress in international law,247 I question whether
this kind of progress may simultaneously undermine another achievement of the postWorld War Two epoch: the near-elimination of the standard of civilization and the
universalization of sovereign equality.
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